

Operation
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Appendix
Reference

11.4.20 The Comprehensive report was requested in March 1999 and completed by C Squad DC [REDACTED] in September of that year.
[REDACTED]

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11.4.21 [REDACTED] is still a serving officer and has provided a statement to the effect that [REDACTED] does not remember any contact with TCA and is not sure how the information could have come to their attention. However, [REDACTED] admits that irregular meetings were held with contacts from other organisations, and cannot rule out the possibility that someone connected with TCA was present at such a gathering.

11.4.22 [REDACTED]

11.4.23 [REDACTED]

11.4.24 [REDACTED]

11.4.25 [REDACTED] has provided a statement to Operation Herne, in which [REDACTED] confirmed that [REDACTED] did not remember [REDACTED] and could not remember providing the information to the TCA.

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11.4.26

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] there is a clear gap
between the information recorded [REDACTED] and those of the
TCA:

[REDACTED]

11.4.27 It is clear that Francis did report on both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
however, there is no evidence to show that the information provided
by Francis was contemporaneously passed to TCA. Similarly, there
is nothing to suggest that the information in TCA records came from
a police source. However, it is known that the documented source for
the information, [REDACTED] had direct links with Special Branches.

11.4.28 Although he has claimed responsibility, there are no reports to
corroborate Francis' assertion that he linked [REDACTED] to YRE.

11.4.29

[REDACTED]

11.5 Francis's Allegations: the [REDACTED] incident

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11.5.1 August 2013: In a Guardian article, Francis stated that he supplied information on two individuals, which he claims would only be known to police through his undercover work; namely that they were members of Youth Against Racism Away Team (YRE) (AT).

11.5.2 According to the article, the Blacklist records for these individuals show that they were "observed" or "apprehended" at a protest against right wing groups laying wreaths at the Cenotaph in 1999.

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11.5.3 [REDACTED] has been examined and contains a report from a uniformed officer, PC [REDACTED] regarding the stop of [REDACTED] individuals in [REDACTED] opposite the [REDACTED] on the day in question.

11.5.4 The people involved were: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] PC [REDACTED] records that [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] belonged to the Socialist Party. No further information regarding the political leanings of the individuals is noted; however the stop slip was passed to SB by the local collator and logged as [REDACTED]

11.5.5

[REDACTED]

11.5.6

[REDACTED]

11.5.7 The information on the Blacklist is attributed to the construction company, [REDACTED] although an individual source is not cited.

11.5.8 There is no evidence to suggest that the information regarding the police stop was shared outside of the organisation.

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- 11.5.9 There is a gap of over 2 years between the end of Francis' SDS deployment in August 1997 and the appearance of the information on TCA records in November 1999.
- 11.5.10 The article's claim that knowledge of the Away Team's existence was known to "only a handful of members at the heart of" YRE and Francis' claim that he could be the only source for this information is also undermined by a World In Action programme from November 1993. The show explained that the group of approximately 25 individuals were linked to YRE and used for defence and attack.

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11.6 ICO's assertion that information emanated from the police

11.6.1 In September 2011, [REDACTED] began [REDACTED] hearings at the **Central London Employment Tribunal**, claiming that [REDACTED] was denied work through illegal blacklisting. Giving evidence for [REDACTED] ICO Investigations Manager, [REDACTED] stated that the TCA files included information that;

"...could have come from the police and the security organisations."

11.6.2 [REDACTED] repeated these claims in [REDACTED] evidence to the Scottish Affairs Select Committee on 16th October 2012, clarifying:

"It is the language that is contained within some of the reports."

11.6.3 The instances [REDACTED] cites include references to arrests, registered keeper details for vehicles and in-depth reports on individuals, called 'Special Investigations' or 'Specials'.

11.6.4 There is no definitive evidence of police involvement in the provision of any police data in the above cases and [REDACTED] does not appear to consider alternative sources, such as private investigators, unions [REDACTED]

11.6.5 Despite this, it is possible that police officers have shared information with third parties, which has then been passed on to TCA. In handwritten notes submitted to SASC by Ian Kerr's wife, there is a reference to: "one specific construction company" submitting enquiries on behalf of SB.

11.6.6 One potential instance of this is [REDACTED] who has stated that [REDACTED] was in regular contact with Special Branch officers (please see 11.1.18).

11.6.7 [REDACTED] Appeal was rejected in March 2015 on the grounds that [REDACTED] was employed by a contractor at the time, not the company (Carillion) against whom [REDACTED] was claiming. A further appeal to the Supreme Court was denied in August. However, [REDACTED] legal team are adamant that an approach to the European Courts for Human Rights, under articles 8 and 11 will be successful.

11.6.8 Also found within the items seized by the ICO was a page of Ian Kerr's handwritten notes taken from a meeting on 6th November 2008, which has come to be known in the press as the "**Woodstock meeting**" due to it's location in Oxfordshire.

11.6.9 The Woodstock meeting was arranged by a group called the **Construction Industry Forum (CIF)**, a group of representatives from around the industry to discuss trends in business and share ideas. One item on the agenda was a presentation from National Extremism Technical Coordination Unit (NETCU) officer, **Gordon Mills** about the work of his unit.

11.6.10 Inquiries have shown that this was a standard presentation, consisting of open source information, designed to highlight the problems linked to protest movements and how NETCU could assist.

11.6.11 At that time, NETCU was an **Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)** unit, based in **Cambridgeshire**. It was therefore decided to try to locate the files from NETCU by consulting **Cambridgeshire Constabulary**.

11.6.12 In order to ascertain what kind of relationship and communication existed between NETCU officers and its subscribing organisations, Operation Herne approached Cambridgeshire Constabulary to obtain access to its records.

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11.6.13 Cambridgeshire's records management team have been unable to locate any paper files from the unit. Their Information Technology (IT) team have stated that all NETCU computer records were destroyed in July 2012. They have no record of any transfer or copying of information.

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11.6.14 Former members of NETCU have confirmed that the unit closed down upon the amalgamation of Domestic Extremism units in 2011. At that point, it has been suggested that all paperwork was shredded and it is believed that the computer records were copied by the National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU).

11.6.15



11.6.16 TCA is mentioned only as a result of the 2009 court case and ensuing media reports. Blacklisting is mentioned in relation to strike action, specifically around the Olympic site.

11.7 Alternative Sources

11.7.1 As reported above, Operation Reuben can say that there are numerous potential alternative sources of information for many of the records on the Blacklist. They are follows:

11.7.2 [REDACTED] has confirmed that before 2006, their procedures around the sharing of information were: "quite lax". Even now, it is possible to request information from them with: "reasonable cause".

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11.7.3 **Open Source reporting:** Both the EL and TCA relied heavily on media reporting for their records. This could have included anything from stories naming campaigners, to the note of court appearances in local newspapers.

See 22, 24 & 73

11.7.4 **Private Investigators:** The Economic League appears to have commonly used Private Investigators to compile their "Special", in-depth reports. They were also employed by companies to complete checks on prospective employees, verifying their claims.

11.7.5 **Union Representatives:** There are numerous mentions of union officials being the source of information within The Consulting Association files. It is also known that they would report direct to companies and to Special Branch.

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11.7.6 **Former Military or Police officers:**
Although no records have been found to give specific details, it is known that the Economic League employed people with police and military backgrounds.

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Please see 31

11.7.7

Recommendation:

Operation Herne has found no trace of SDS officers being involved in the sharing of information.

1. There is also no direct evidence of SB officers being involved in such practices, although there are clear examples of officers having contact with and meeting representatives from industry.
2. Although Operation Herne has dealt with numerous people from outside SDS circles, the wider exploitation of this field falls outside its remit.
3. [REDACTED] contacts book could offer opportunities for the MPS and other police areas to pursue this line of investigation.

11.8 Allegation that [REDACTED] provided information held on the Blacklist

See 10

11.8.1 An article published in the March 2013 edition of **Big Issue in the North** by **Mark Metcalf** raises the question of whether information gathered by UCO [REDACTED] under the alias of Mark Cassidy, was passed on to the Blacklist.

11.8.2 Metcalf suggests that [REDACTED] links to Trade organisations such as the BWG through the CRC in North East London offered him access to private information about people, which may have ultimately ended up being used to deny people work through TCA.

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11.8.3 A review of reporting linked to [REDACTED] (using the SDS' Hard Drive) shows that during his tenure, he reported on over 300 individuals. For many of these 300, only the names are mentioned with no further detail: this can be due to their presence at a meeting or protest, etc. By cross-referencing all of these names with the Blacklist, Operation Herne has found 16 individuals from the Blacklist are mentioned by [REDACTED] some of which entailed detailed reporting.

11.8.4 There is no evidence to prove that any of the intelligence provided by [REDACTED] appeared on the Blacklist.

11.8.5 Information similar to that provided by SDS operatives can be found on the Blacklist. However, no evidence exists to show that SDS information was passed to Blacklisting organisations directly. Much of this information was available to EL/TCA, via alternative sources, such as private investigators (see 11.7) and subscribing companies, [REDACTED]

11.8.6 It is of course possible that some information gathered by the SDS was passed to industry contacts on a personal basis by SB officers from other departments. For example, [REDACTED] claims to have had a reciprocal relationship with Special Branches around the country, including MPSB until [REDACTED]. However, there is no method for identifying whether this happened.

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- 11.8.7 It was possible for information and intelligence relevant to the geographical or topic area to be passed between regional Special Branches, when deemed necessary or upon application. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Although each regional SB would work under the same national guidelines; operational practicalities, such as the number of officers, could have led to different methodology. SB files were generally only marked up on the sleeve when they were removed from the office. If an officer simply viewed them, it would not be recorded.

- 11.8.8 Thus, an officer from a regional SB could have called their counterpart within MPSB, who could check the information held within MPSBR. This national scope makes it difficult to investigate, and beyond the resources of Operation Herne at present.

12 Statements & Discussions

12.1 A series of statements has been obtained dealing with the question of collaboration. These have been taken from people within the Metropolitan Police, Special Branches, NETCU, The Economic League, The Consulting Association and companies from the construction industry.

12.2 Amongst other topics, the statements provide an insight into:

- The formation and operation of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch Industrial Unit
- The relationship between Special Branches and both the Economic League and private industry
- The relationship between NETCU and the Consulting Association
- Private Industry's involvement with the police
- MPSB C Squad's reporting on key individuals

12.3 Key statements include:

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12.4 **Jack Winder:** The former Director of Intelligence and Research for the Economic League, Winder confirmed that EL had regular contact with the police in various regions. However, all discussions were general in their nature and any information flow was from the EL to police.

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12.5 DC [REDACTED] worked for MPSB's Industrial Unit for several years from [REDACTED], assigned to the Engineering sector. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] knew of the EL's existence and potential use to MPSB, but did not know of any formal agreement or regular contact. [REDACTED] was responsible for a data breach in [REDACTED] where the Economic League erroneously recorded a [REDACTED] as being linked to a [REDACTED] following an inquiry with DC [REDACTED] (please see 11.1.7 - 11.1.9).

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12.6

██████████ was the ██████████ of TCA's Chief Officer, Ian Kerr. ██████████ stated that ██████████ worked on a part time basis for the company, but never playing a part in the collation or dissemination of any of the information on the lists. ██████████ stated that ██████████ only knowledge of TCA contact with police was Gordon Mills' presentation at a conference.

Appendix Reference 60

See 51

12.7

DI Gordon Mills (Retired): Mr Mills worked for NETCU from 2006 -2011. On November 6th 2008 he gave a standard industry presentation to a small meeting organised by the CIF, a group of representatives from around the industry, on behalf of a colleague: the presentation was made up of open source material. DI Mills was able to provide a copy of the generic presentation used at that time, which is included as Appendix 24. He did not know of EL or TCA and knew of no direct contact with them.

See 51

12.8

██████████ In 2008, ██████████ was a civilian ██████████ for NETCU. ██████████ was scheduled to make the presentation to the CIF, but was not available due to annual leave. ██████████ understands that Mr Kerr was a delegate at the conference, invited by one of the companies. However, ██████████ stated that there was no direct link between TCA and NETCU.

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12.9

ACC Anton Setchell (Retired): Mr Setchell was the **National Domestic Extremism Coordinator**. He stated that there was no direct link to TCA and that the presentation given by DI Mills would have been generic in nature, with only open source intelligence included. He had become aware of blacklisting since his departure from the police, as he took up the position of Global Director of Group Security for construction firm, **Laing O'Rourke** which is cited in the legal action by the Blacklist Support Group.

See 44

12.10

PS ██████████: PS ██████████ was a DC on the left wing desks ██████████ ██████████ was specifically responsible for the "comprehensive" (intelligence report) on ██████████ ██████████ completed in 1999. ██████████ has stated that ██████████ had no contact with any external organisation such as TCA.

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See 42

12.11 DCI [REDACTED] was a DC on the left wing desks [REDACTED] was specifically responsible for the "comprehensive" (intelligence report) for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] completed in 1995. [REDACTED] has confirmed that [REDACTED] had no contact with any external organisation such as TCA.

See 31

12.12 [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] who worked for [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] years in total. [REDACTED] was a regular user of the Economic League and The Consulting Association. [REDACTED] claimed that the flow of information was a reciprocal agreement. [REDACTED] has provided a statement and [REDACTED] Special Branch contacts book, which is exhibited as [REDACTED]

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12.13 [REDACTED] worked for [REDACTED] for approximately [REDACTED] years [REDACTED] observed [REDACTED] collaboration with Trade Union contacts, the EL and TCA. [REDACTED] also met numerous Special Branch officers through social events organised by [REDACTED] did not receive information on individuals from Special Branch officers and in fact insisted that the Trade Unions were the source of much of the information passed to the Blacklist.

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12.14 DCS [REDACTED] said that the SDS had no dealings with the Industrial Section. Similarly, [REDACTED] didn't have any dealings with the EL or TCA. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was one of many people from industry and the unions who provided information to SB. [REDACTED] was adamant that the flow of information was one-way and that SB never shared intelligence with either private individuals or companies.

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12.15

██████████ worked for the construction firm, the ██████████ was mentioned by Ian Kerr as a TCA contact during his SASC interview. ██████████ stated that although directly involved with human resources and employment law for the company for many years, ██████████ had very little to do with the EL or TCA. ██████████ became aware of the EL due to their literature, which was passed through the management. ██████████ then met Ian Kerr at a "Contractors' Association" meeting. ██████████ stated that ██████████ had never passed information to either organisation, nor had ██████████ sought information from them. ██████████ had in fact helped to establish in-house vetting and employment history practices for the group, which ██████████ believed negated the need for an external Blacklist. Despite ██████████ original cooperation, efforts to obtain a signed statement from ██████████ have failed and after several months of attempts, a decision was taken in July 2015 to rely on ██████████ notes.

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12.16

DS ██████████: DS ██████████ was present for the inception of the ██████████ stated that the EL was a "well-established" conduit for information, but reiterated that the flow of information was strictly one way. ██████████ admitted to meeting Jack Winder on a regular basis in pubs local to **New Scotland Yard (NSY)**. DS ██████████ declined the opportunity to provide a formal statement at this stage. Amongst others, ██████████ named ██████████ as a DC whom ██████████ managed. ██████████ sought legal counsel, which resulted in ██████████ refusal to sign a statement.

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12.17

DS ██████████: DS ██████████ worked for the unit from 1971 until late 1973. ██████████ admitted that ██████████ was aware of the Economic League, but stated that ██████████ had no contact with them at all.

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12.18

DC ██████████: DC ██████████ was a Special Branch officer in ██████████ a much smaller unit than MPSB, leading to a greater mix of duties. ██████████ had been introduced to Jack Winder in the late 1960s and maintained contact with ██████████ a few times per year throughout his career, meeting in a pub in ██████████ DC ██████████ treated ██████████ as a contact only, not a source, discussing general topics, but never individuals. ██████████ does not remember ever committing anything discussed to a report, as it was too general in content.

12.19 DC [REDACTED]: DC [REDACTED] was a career Special Branch officer who worked in the majority of SB's departments, although not the Industrial Unit. [REDACTED] was aware of the Economic League, but was warned not to liaise with them when [REDACTED] first joined SB. [REDACTED] knew [REDACTED] socially, as [REDACTED] attended the [REDACTED] and was invited to a couple of international cricket matches. However, [REDACTED] also remembers working with him on occasions during [REDACTED] time on the [REDACTED] as [REDACTED] had several contracts which involved work on sites targeted by [REDACTED]

12.20 [REDACTED] was adamant that corporate spies were very active during this time and as such there was great potential that they could be responsible for a lot of the intelligence flow.

12.21 DS [REDACTED]: DS [REDACTED] was employed on the Industrial Unit between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. According to [REDACTED] the Industrial Section's role was to monitor subversion and infiltration of industry and the public sector by the full range of extremists. [REDACTED] focus was the transport and education sectors. [REDACTED] states that [REDACTED] did not deal with the Economic League personally and cannot say whether others did. However, [REDACTED] explained that a large part of their work was done by forging close links with significant people within their specific areas, who would be referred to as "contacts".

12.22 PC [REDACTED]: PC [REDACTED] worked with the MPS' Territorial Support Group (TSG) in 1998. [REDACTED] was identified as the author of the stop report for the [REDACTED] incident in 1999. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of the Economic League or The Consulting Association.

13 Conclusions

13.1.0 **Allegation:** Police, including Special Branches supplied information which appeared on the Blacklist, funded by the country's major construction firms, The Consulting Association and/or other agencies in breach of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA).

13.1.1 When considered within the remit of Operation Reuben, there is no evidence to suggest that the SDS set out to procure information for, or ever provided any information directly to any private company, including the Economic League or The Consulting Association.

13.1.2 However, Operation Reuben has found that sections of the policing community throughout the UK had both overt and covert contact with external organisations for reasons stemming from crime reporting and prevention to the maintenance of public order and the prevention of terrorism. For example:

- Special Branches throughout the UK had direct contact with the Economic League, public authorities, private industry and trade unions.
- The wider Police service had direct contact with private companies and institutions throughout the country
- NETCU had contact with private industry and government institutions. They are also known to have made a presentation at which Ian Kerr of The Consulting Association was present

This extensive contact means that although there is no specific evidence there is a distinct possibility that information was passed, outside of the normal procedures and agreements by individuals.

13.1.3 Despite this, it should be remembered that the police were not the only source and that Blacklisting organisations used numerous methods for collating their material (as per 11.7).

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- 13.1.4 The information supplied by [REDACTED] the statement of DC [REDACTED] reveal a potentially improper flow of information from Special Branch to external organisations, which ultimately appeared on the Blacklist.
- 13.1.5 However, it must be stressed that this does not appear to be systemic and there were in fact strict guidelines in place with respect to the sharing of information. Although there were established forms of contact and protocols were in place with regard to the exchange of information, the possibility of officers passing on information without direct permission cannot be discounted.
- 13.1.6 Operation Herne's research has shown that the advent of the Data Protection Act (introduced in 1987) led to tighter policies with regard to the sharing of information for the Police Service. This is evidenced in the discussions with the former Lancashire officers, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] who stated that prior to the DPA, information was shared on a more ad-hoc basis.
- 13.1.7 This conclusion refers to general Policing and Special Branch only. There is no evidence that the SDS ever shared information with industry or the Blacklist. The SDS was by its very nature a secret unit, of which even some other parts of Special Branch did not know. It had strict firewalls in place with regard to its product and information would not have been passed outside of their strict circle of recipients.
- 13.1.8 Despite this, Operation Herne has clearly established that on the balance of probabilities and that based upon the extent of investigations conducted to date, the allegation that the police or Special Branches supplied information is 'Proven'.

There appears to be a case to answer for unauthorised sharing of information under the Data Protection Act 1984.

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- 13.2 **Allegation:** Intelligence collected by Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) undercover officer Peter Francis, referring to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (Appendix 8) appeared in the files of the blacklisting agency.
- 13.2.1 There is no direct evidence to link the information provided by Francis to TCA records. Similarly, there is nothing to suggest that this information came from a police source. The contemporaneous reporting is shown as being linked to [REDACTED] a company with documented Special Branch links. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] There is a significant delay between Francis reporting and similar information appearing upon the Blacklist. Due to the untimely demise of Ian Kerr, it is no longer possible to check the veracity of TCA's records.
- 13.2.2 **Thus, the investigation finds that this allegation is 'Not Proven'.**
- 13.3 **Allegation:** SDS officers provided intelligence regarding the involvement of 3 individuals in Youth Against Racism in Europe's Away Team, which appeared on The Consulting Association's Blacklist.
- 13.3.1 Searches of the Operation Herne databases and records have found that there is no SDS reporting in relation to the [REDACTED] incident. A report was filed by a uniformed police officer, PC [REDACTED] regarding the stop of [REDACTED]. This was incorporated into a generic SB organisation file with no amendments or additions. There is no evidence to suggest that this was shared outside the organisation.

- 13.3.2 Francis claims that he provided intelligence on these individuals' involvement with YRE's Away Team. The principle argument against Francis' responsibility for this information is the time lapse. Again, there is insufficient evidence to prove or disprove this, although the insinuation that this information could only have come from the police is obviously untrue. In fact, [REDACTED] the person most closely associated with the information stated that it would more likely have come from a Union representative.
- 13.3.3 The claim regarding the secrecy of the Away Team itself is undermined, as the existence of the group had been public knowledge since at least 1993, when members of the group appeared on a World In Action programme called **Violence with Violence**, first aired on 13/11/1993. This was also cited in an **Independent** newspaper article by the journalist **Jojo Moyes** on 15/11/1993.
- 13.3.4 **The investigation finds that this allegation is 'Not Proven'.**
- 13.4.0 **Allegation:** ICO Senior Investigator [REDACTED] stated in the Observer on 03/10/2012: "the information was so specific and it contained in effect operational information that would not have formed anything other than a police record". (Appendix 9)
- 13.4.1 In relation to the three issues raised by [REDACTED] there is no evidence to substantiate his claim that the information was provided by police sources. It is evident that there are other sources from which this information could have been obtained.
- 13.4.2 **The investigation finds that this allegation is 'Not Proven'.**

- 13.5.0 **Allegation:** As a member of the Building Workers Group, Mark Cassidy [REDACTED] collected information on individuals, which was then passed to The Consulting Association (Appendix 10).
- 13.5.1 Although [REDACTED] mentions the names of individuals who appear on the list, there is no evidence that he provided any information which appeared on the Blacklist. All available information points to the fact that the SDS had established firewalls in place, with intelligence reports being passed through different departments protecting them from any external influence. However, information similar to that provided by SDS operatives can be found on the list, although it is often accredited to other sources, for example [REDACTED]
- 13.5.2 **The investigation finds that this allegation is 'Not Proven'.**

14 Recommendations

- 14.1 In order to properly establish the scale of the 'information sharing' between Special Branches throughout the United Kingdom and the construction industry, further investigation is necessary; albeit this will be necessarily limited, given the passage of time and the quite proper weeding of Police Special Branch records. This is beyond the remit of Operation Reuben and Operation Herne.

It is recommended that further investigation should take place to establish the scale of the 'information sharing', utilising the information supplied by [REDACTED] address book which contains details of just under [REDACTED] people from [REDACTED] different policing areas around the UK. Amongst those names are [REDACTED] officers linked to the MPS, and it is believed that the MPS may wish to speak to these officers further.

15 Organisational Learning

- 15.1 There have clearly been many areas identified where the Police can improve on performance. Many of these areas have already been addressed with the introduction of RIPA in 2000 and the Data Protection Act 1988. The Organisational Learning from this and other operations will be the subject of a further report in due course.

Senior Investigating Officer

DCI [REDACTED]

A Indices and Search Parameters

1 Holmes/Altia

'**HOLMES**' - Home Office Large Major Enquiry System is an investigative tool. **ALTIA** is a system that scans and stores documents and has a search function that can include "Boolean" searches for either strings of characters or for whole words together with other words included in the same document. This also includes scanned SDS original paper documents which were generated in the pre-computer era.

2 Hard Drive

The **Hard Drive** contains electronic copies of documents that were created by the SDS. These include intelligence reports, policies and correspondence. Intelligence reports on the Hard Drive have also been found within MPS Special Branch records in a sanitised version. SDS files from the 1970's to the early 1990's do not exist in electronic format on the Hard Drive as computers were not common place at this time.

3 Forensic Tool Kit (FTK)

The **FTK** enables a more precise search method of the material held within the Hard Drive whilst preserving its integrity. Importantly the FTK can also access and display deleted or corrupted files which the Hard Drive system on Microsoft Word cannot.

4 Special Branch Records

MPS Special Branch records is an information storage system that holds intelligence handled within Special Branch unsuitable to be stored on other MPS databases. It contains documents that have a protective marking of "Secret" or below. This allows for the receipt, assessment, creation, amendment, deletion and dissemination for entry onto the **National Special Branch Intelligence System (NSBIS)**. For the purposes of this initial report, only those records identified as relating to the SDS have been scanned onto ALTIA and have been reviewed.

5 **Commander's Archive**

This archive contains sensitive documentation which is not stored in MPS Special Branch records. A search of the document titles contained within the Commander's Archive spreadsheet was completed and those files identified as relevant to this enquiry then examined.

6 **Generic Indices**

In addition to these specialist indices, Operation Reuben has conducted searches of the standard police indices, including Cris (the MPS' Crime recording system), Crimint (the MPS' Criminal Intelligence recording system), Stops database (the MPS' record of people stopped), Custody records (linked to the national system for Custody) and the Police National Computer.

7 **Professional Standards records**

MPS' Patriarch and Tribune databases have been searched. In addition to this, a request for each area of the UK to check their own Professional Standards department records.

Search Parameters

1 To identify reporting, each individual was searched across the aforementioned databases containing all documentation held by Operation Herne, along with the generic databases, using the Integrated Intelligence Platform (IIP) tool. Searches of IMOS and the "Commander's Archive" were also performed.

2 Across the databases there is considerable duplication of documents, and some documents were found to contain more than one variation of a name. As a result all documents identified had to be individually reviewed to establish their relevance to this enquiry. Only fully verifiable identifications of the names were considered as 'traced' based on the context of the information provided.

B Document Retention and Disposal

1 In common with records and information management throughout the public sector, the MPS is subject to a number of statutory regulations and controls. These derive principally from Acts of Parliament and associated Codes of Practice or powers vested in regulatory organisations such as the Office of the Information Commissioner.

2 A record is defined as recorded information, in any media or format, which is created or received in the course of an individual's or organisation's activity that provides reliable evidence of policy, actions and decisions. Records management is the function of creating, organising and managing records to ensure they provide evidence of activity, decision making and policy. Also that they are easily retrievable when required and are disposed of either by destruction or transfer to an archive at the appropriate time.

3 Management of Police Information (MOPI)

The code was initially developed by the Home Office under the Police Act 1996 and 1997. This developed further following the **Richard Inquiry** which looked at information availability failures relating to the Soham murders in July 2002. The Home Office produced a Code of Practice for the Management of Police Information which was published **14th November 2005**. The purpose of The Code is to ensure that there is broad consistency between police forces in the way information is managed within the law. Also to ensure effective use of available information within and between individual police forces and other agencies, and to provide fair treatment to members of the public. The Code of Practice describes policing purposes relating to information management at a high level and sets out the principles governing the management of information (including personal information). This led to the publication of the **Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)** Guidance to Management of Police Information in 2006.

4 The Guidance states that police information is information required for policing purposes. Policing purposes are:

- Protecting life and property.
- Preserving order.
- Preventing the commission of offences,
- Bringing offenders to justice and
- Any duty or responsibility arising from Common or Statute law.

These five policing purposes provide the legal basis for collecting, recording, evaluating, sharing and retaining police information.

5 **MPS Record Management Policy**

Records should be retained only for the minimum period required commensurate with policing purpose, administrative purposes and any relevant legal provisions. There are no circumstances where records may be retained on an indefinite basis. Retention periods for administrative records will normally be set by the relevant portfolio holder or lead branch after consultation with the MPS Records Management Branch, which retains a database of retention/disposal periods. The setting of sensible retention periods may involve accepting a degree of risk about the effect of destruction at a particular time. Records that support the policing purpose as set out in the Guidance on the Management of Police Information should be reviewed, retained and disposed of in accordance with the guidelines set out in Section 7 of that document or any corporate MPS Retention and Disposal Schedule that may be published.

7.6 Registered files are reviewed and, where appropriate, destroyed by the MPS Records Management Branch. The responsibility for the disposal of non-registered records rests with local management. Records over twenty years of age for which the MPS has no further policing or administrative use and which appear suitable for permanent preservation may be transferred to The National Archives or other suitable place of deposit. All other records should be destroyed.

C Appendices

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13	Guardian article, dated 13/03/2015: Ex-undercover officer reveals that covert police unit spied on trade union members - full statement.	191 - 193
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25	Scottish Affairs Select Committee: Blacklisting in Employment: Final Report, 18/03/2015.	597 - 635
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27	ucpi.org.uk: Summary of Undercover Policing Inquiry.	
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29	Copy of Special Branch file: [REDACTED] Complaint by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] that Special Branch information had jeopardised [REDACTED] proposed employment.	656 - 740

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47	The Independent article by Jojo Moyes, dated 15/11/1993: Hard-left violence "hurting anti-racist organisations".	958 - 959
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49	Extract from SASC website: submissions from Mary Kerr to Mr Ian Davidson, March 2015. Page 5 from Section 9 of 11. Handwritten notes by Mr Ian Kerr in preparation for the SASC hearing.	997 - 998
50	Building.co.uk article by Will Martin dated 18/03/2015: Blacklisting campaigner loses appeal against Carillion.	999
51	Copy of handwritten notes seized by ICO, written by Ian Kerr regarding the Woodstock meeting with NETCU, dated 06/11/2008.	1000 - 1001
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